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I. INTRODUCTION
Survey evidence is often used to address disputed issues of fact in
intellectual property and other areas of the law.1 Survey evidence has played
a special role in advertising law, by helping to determine the messages
received by members of the intended audience exposed to advertising.2 This
paper will address that role, and attempt to identify trends and offer
comments and suggestions.
Although courts have typically referred to such studies as “consumer
surveys,” the intended audience of an advertising message is not necessarily
“consumers” as that word is normally used. The audience could be
professionals, such as healthcare professionals, or non-consumer groups,
such as retailers. For the purposes of this paper, a survey of an intended or
target audience conducted to determine the message communicated by an
advertising claim is referred to as a “communication survey.”
II. RATIONALE FOR THE USE OF SURVEYS; OVERVIEW OF LEGAL
ISSUES
A. Use of Surveys in Lanham Act False Advertising Disputes
The use of survey evidence in advertising disputes is most common in
lawsuits brought by a marketer challenging the advertising of a competitor
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.3

1. See, e.g., Jacob Jacoby, 1 TRADEMARK SURVEYS, DESIGNING, IMPLEMENTING, AND
EVALUATING SURVEYS § 1.20, 44–56 (A.B.A., 2013).
2. See Jacob Jacoby et al., Survey Evidence in Deceptive Advertising Cases Under the Lanham
Act: An Historical Review of Comments from the Bench, 84 Trademark Rep. 541, 544–76 (1994)
(reviewing and analyzing the use of surveys in Lanham Act litigation up to the 1990s); E. Deborah Jay,
Ten Truths of False Advertising Surveys, 103 TRADEMARK REP. 1116, 1120–71 (2013) (cataloguing
issues in the design of communication surveys).
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1377, 1390 (2014) (holding there is no consumer standing under the Lanham Act).
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1. Elements of Section 43(a) Claim
Section 43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act proscribes any “false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . in
commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities . . . .”4 The Supreme Court
has held that “to come within the zone of interests in a suit for false
advertising under § 1125(a), a plaintiff must allege an injury to a commercial
interest in reputation or sales.”5
The elements of a Lanham Act 43(a)(1)(B) claim have been set forth as
follows: (1) a false statement of fact by the defendant in a commercial
advertisement about its own or another’s product; (2) the statement actually
deceived or has the tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its audience;
(3) the deception is material, in that it is likely to influence the purchasing
decision; (4) the defendant caused its false statement to enter interstate
commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result
of the false statement, either by direct diversion of sales from itself to
defendant or by a lessening of the goodwill associated with its products.6
Court decisions often state that when an advertisement is literally false,
consumer deception is presumed, and “the court may grant relief without
reference to the advertisement’s [actual] impact on the buying public.”7
However, where an advertisement is literally true but misleading, the
advertisement “has left an impression on the listener that conflicts with
reality,” and extrinsic evidence, in the form of a consumer confusion survey,
is typically required.8

4. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
5. Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1390.
6. See, e.g., Logan v. Burgers Ozark Country Cured Hams, Inc., 263 F.3d 447, 462 (5th Cir. 2001);
Balance Dynamics Corp. v. Schmitt Indus., Inc., 204 F.3d 683, 689 (6th Cir. 2000); Blue Dane Simmental
Corp. v. Am. Simmental Ass’n, 178 F.3d 1035, 1042 (8th Cir. 1999); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover
Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997); ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d
958, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
7. Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 1982), superseded by
statute, FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6), as recognized in Johnson & Johnson v. GAC Int’l, Inc., 862 F.2d 975,
979 (2d Cir. 1988); see Osmose, Inc. v. Viance, LLC, 612 F.3d 1298, 1319 (11th Cir. 2010); Cashmere
& Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 311 (1st Cir. 2002); Balance Dynamics Corp.
v. Schmitt Indus., 204 F.3d 683, 693 (6th Cir. 2000) (explaining that while “a plaintiff need not
demonstrate actual customer deception in order to obtain relief under the Lanham Act, . . . the ‘literal
falsity’ rule has never permitted a plaintiff to recover marketplace damages without other proof that such
damages occurred”).
8. Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 229 (2d Cir. 1999); see PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead
Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 120 (4th Cir. 2011); Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800
Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2002); Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6,
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2. Distinguishing Between Literal and Implied Claims
In the author’s view, the formulation set forth above distinguishing
literally false advertising messages and misleading messages, as well as the
use of the term “impact,” tends to misstate the proper role of a
communication survey in advertising litigation. For example, express claims
such as, “XYZ automobile gets 30 miles per gallon in city driving,” or “ABC
medication is more effective for relief of back pain than regular strength
aspirin,” are clearly literal claims. In clearly literal claims, the messages are
sufficiently unambiguous that no survey is necessary to assess their meaning.
Whether the challenger can meet its burden of proof to show that the
assertions are false will depend on product performance evidence, not survey
evidence.
Now consider the phrase “impact on the buying public.” Does this
mean “impact” in that the advertising affected purchase decisions, and, if so,
to what degree? Many consumers may choose not to believe an advertising
message that is shown in court to be false, while others may accept the
message as accurate but choose not to be influenced by it in their purchasing
decisions. And, if the false claim is non-comparative and there are many
competitors, measuring the market “impact” of the false claim will likely be
difficult. Nevertheless, if an unambiguous claim is false (i.e. “literally
false”), the Lanham Act, and state deception law, presumably provides for
an injunctive remedy, assuming the other elements, including materiality, are
met, because it is illogical and inequitable that a marketer should be free to
disseminate a false material advertising claim, even if the “impact on the
buying public” cannot be demonstrated or quantified.
An example of an ambiguous claim is provided by United Industries
Corp. v. Clorox Co.9 At issue was the claim that a product “kills roaches in
24 hours.”10 The court held that the claim was not literally false, because the
consumer message could have been that roaches that came into contact with
the advertiser’s product died within twenty-four hours—an apparently true
statement—or that all or most roaches in the infestation were eliminated
within twenty-four hours—an apparently false statement.11
A
communication survey could, in that case, have determined whether the
target audience received the challenged message. But, assuming that the

14 (7th Cir. 1992); Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 960
F.2d 294, 297–98 (2d Cir. 1992).
9. United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175 (8th Cir. 1980).
10. Id. at 1181.
11. Id.
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challenged message had been communicated to a not-insubstantial
percentage of the target audience, the communication part of the survey
would still not have measured the impact, or degree of impact, on purchase
decisions. In other words, a communication survey cannot address what
impact the message had.
A preferred way to describe the role of a communication survey is to
avoid the tendency to refer to “literally false messages” versus “misleading
messages,” but rather to distinguish between literal messages—whether true
or false—compared to implied messages—whether true or false. This
formulation recognizes that other evidence will determine whether the
message communicated, either literally or by implication, can be shown to
be false, and additional evidence will be needed to measure the impact of a
false claim (literal or by implication) on purchase decisions. Evidence of
impact could be survey evidence, but the survey would be measuring
something in addition to message communication.
3. Use of Survey Evidence to Discern the Message Communicated by
Advertising Claims
Under the Lanham Act, as noted, a competitor can challenge as false an
advertising claim that delivers a literal message without extrinsic evidence
of the consumer message.12 An example would be: “You’re just not gonna
get the best picture out of some fancy big screen TV without DIRECTV. It’s
broadcast in 1080i.”13 The Second Circuit found that that claim was “flatly
untrue; the uncontroverted factual record establishes that viewers can, in fact,
get the same ‘best picture’ by ordering HD programming from their cable
service provider.”14 Communication surveys are accordingly not relevant if
the opposing party is challenging the literal or unambiguous message
communicated by an advertising claim.15
A number of Lanham Act decisions have held that if an advertising
claim is on its face susceptible to two or more plausible meanings, it cannot
be literally false.16 In that scenario, the challenger will need to show, usually

12. See, e.g., Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 154 (2d Cir. 2007).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Groupe SEB USA, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192, 202 (3d Cir. 2014)
(properly ignoring survey evidence offered by advertiser to purportedly show that claims were
ambiguous, and thus not literally false, where the statements were found to be literal).
16. DIRECTV, 497 F.3d at 158; Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck
Consumer Pharm. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 587 (3d Cir. 2002); Millennium Labs., Inc. v. Ameritox, Ltd., 924
F. Supp. 2d 594, 600 (D. Md. 2013); In re Century 21-RE/MAX Real Estate Advert. Claims Litig., 882
F. Supp. 915, 923 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
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with survey evidence, that the challenged plausible interpretation is being
received by a not-insubstantial number of members of the target audience.17
4. Claims Considered Literal by Necessary Implication
Included within the scope of literal messages are those conveyed by
“necessary implication.” A message is “conveyed by necessary implication
when, considering the advertisement in its entirety, the audience would
recognize the claim as readily as if it had been explicitly stated.”18 In such
circumstance, because the meaning of the advertisement is apparent and not
open to multiple interpretations, survey evidence is unnecessary to determine
that the message conveyed is not the narrow, literal one.
An illustrative example is found in the DIRECTV case.19 In that case,
the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that an advertisement
praising the “amazing picture clarity of DIRECTV HD” such that “‘settling
for cable would be illogical,’ considered in light of the advertisement as a
whole, unambiguously made the false claim that cable’s HD picture quality
is inferior to that of DIRECTV’s,” even though the inferiority was not stated
directly.20 The court noted that where the “words or images, considered in
context, necessarily imply a false message, the advertisement is literally false
and no extrinsic evidence of consumer confusion is required.”21
5. Challenging a Non-Literal Message
Lanham Act courts have, on numerous occasions, stated that while an
advertising statement may be literally true, it can nevertheless be misleading
in context.22 Courts have indicated that a communication survey is relevant,
and sometimes necessary, to challenge a non-literal advertising message.23

17. See infra Section (I)(A)(5) for discussion on the necessary level of confusion that must be
shown by such a survey.
18. Clorox Co. P.R. v. Procter & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir. 2000). Most
federal circuits have recognized the necessary implication doctrine. See, e.g., DIRECTV, 497 F.3d at
158; Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 274 (4th Cir. 2002); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover
Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997).
19. DIRECTV, 497 F.3d at 158.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 390 (8th Cir. 2004);
Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004); Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle
Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 1999); United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1180
(8th Cir. 1998); BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 1081, 1088–89 (7th Cir. 1994).
23. See Clorox Co. P.R., 228 F.3d at 36; United Indus. Corp., 140 F.3d at 1182–83; Southland Sod
Farms, 108 F.3d at 1140.
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For example, in Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & JohnsonMerck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co.,24 the product name “Mylanta Night
Time Strength” for an antacid was at issue. The parties disagreed as to
whether an advertisement for this product conveyed the literal message that
the product was effective when taken before sleeping. The Third Circuit
affirmed a finding by the district court that a consumer survey showing
anywhere between 15% to 25% confusion among consumers was sufficient
to show that the challenger would likely be able to prove that the product
name implied “a false message that the product is specially formulated for
nighttime relief,” or that the combination of the “name and label misled a
substantial portion of consumers to believe that the product provided allnight relief.”25
6. Rationale for the Use of Survey Evidence to Determine Implied
Messages
Reliance on surveys to construe advertising messages dates back to at
least 1976 with District Judge Morris Lasker’s frequently quoted rationale in
American Brands Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.26 In that case, the court
observed that literally true statements still violate the Lanham Act if they
have “a tendency to mislead, confuse or deceive.”27 In such cases, although
a court could interpret the advertisement, “the court’s reaction is at best not
determinative and at worst irrelevant. The question in such cases is: What
does the person to whom the advertisement is addressed find to be the
message?”28 The court held that the challenger failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the competitor cigarette manufacturer’s
advertisement “Now. 2mg ‘tar’ is lowest” had a tendency to mislead or
deceive, due to the challenger’s failure to produce a reliable consumer
survey.29
In 1978, the Second Circuit, in American Home Products Corp. v.
Johnson & Johnson,30 cited Judge Lasker’s rationale and held that it was
proper for the district court to evaluate consumer response data to determine
whether the challenged advertising conveyed a misleading superiority
message. The challenger, the manufacturer of Tylenol, argued that its

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

290 F.3d 578 (3d Cir. 2002).
Id. at 594–95.
413 F. Supp. 1352, 1356–57 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Id. at 1357.
Id.
Id.
577 F.2d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 1978).
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competitor’s advertising misleadingly conveyed that the defendant’s painreliever, Anacin, was superior to Tylenol in reducing pain when, in actuality,
the two products relieved pain to an equal extent. The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court’s finding that two advertisements highlighting
Anacin’s anti-inflammatory properties conveyed a false message of superior
pain relief, even though Tylenol has no anti-inflammatory properties.31
7. Use of Surveys Rejected When Advertising Message Is
Unambiguous
In recent years, several decisions have held that survey evidence is
inadmissible where the advertising message at issue is literally true.32 One
rationale is that surveys may only measure the degree to which consumers
misunderstood the message, rather than the degree to which they were
misled.33 Giving weight to surveys that measure misunderstandings of
facially truthful or unambiguous messages could reduce advertising to
“meaningless puffery” aimed to protect a company from unanticipated
misinterpretations.34 Applying that observation, the Seventh Circuit in Mead
Johnson held that “survey research [cannot be] used to determine the
meaning of words, or to set the standard to which objectively verifiable
claims must be held.”35 In that case, Judge Easterbrook refused to consider
a communication survey submitted to show that the phrase “1st Choice of
Doctors” on infant formula packaging conveyed a misleading message to
consumers because the message was literally true—the advertiser’s product
was recommended by more doctors than any competing infant formula.36
Similarly, in Pernod Ricard USA, LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc.,37 the
district court considered whether branding rum “Havana Club,” even though
the label clearly stated that it was made in Puerto Rico, was misleading on
the theory that the mark implied that the rum was made in Cuba. Following
a bench trial, the court rejected plaintiff’s use of a survey, because “[a]n ad
that is truthful on its face cannot be proven to be misleading by surveying

31. Id. at 170–71.
32. Pernod Ricard USA, LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 238, 250 (D. Del. 2010),
aff’d, 653 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 201 F.3d 883, 886–87
(7th Cir. 2000) (“A ‘misunderstood’ statement is not the same as one designed to mislead.”); 5 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:53 (4th ed. 2003).
33. See Mead Johnson, 201 F.3d at 886–87; see also Transcript of Oral Ruling at 70, AT&T
Mobility v. Cellco P’ship, No. 09 Civ. 3057 (TCB) (N.D. Ga. Nov. 18, 2009).
34. See Mead Johnson, 201 F.3d at 886–87.
35. Id. at 886.
36. Id. at 884.
37. 702 F. Supp. 2d 238.
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customers.”38 On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that because
the label, taken as a whole, was not misleading, “survey evidence has no
helpful part to play on the question of what the label communicates regarding
geographic origin.”39
8. Possible Influence of Intent on the Relevance of a Communication
Survey
A third approach was arguably taken in Merisant Co. v. McNeil
Nutritionals LLC.40 In that case, the challenged claim was Splenda’s “Made
From Sugar” tagline, which a competitor argued implied that Splenda
“contains” sugar or is “natural.”41 There was no factual dispute that Splenda
ingredients were derived from sugar, but did not actually contain any sugar.
In denying summary judgment, and distinguishing Mead Johnson, the court
held that at trial, survey evidence would be admissible because the
challenged message was ambiguous on its face and, arguably, had been
designed to mislead.42 Thus, the court appears to have weighed intent as a
relevant factor on the issue of survey admissibility.
9. Trend Away from Consideration of Survey Evidence to Construe
Advertising Messages
Critics have argued, based on the Mead Johnson line of cases, that it is
incongruous for today’s federal judges in Lanham Act false advertising
lawsuits to shy away from interpreting advertising communications with the
same amount of confidence as Securities Act disclosures.43 The continued
development and use of the “necessary implication” principle arguably
points in the direction of an expanded role for the courts in construing
advertising claims. Moreover, in the post-Daubert era, a motion to exclude
an opponent’s consumer survey as flawed is virtually de rigueur in Lanham
Act lawsuits,44 and therefore, both parties will typically bear considerable
expense in dealing with survey evidence.

38. Id. at 250.
39. Pernod Ricard USA, LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 653 F.3d 241, 250 (3d Cir. 2011).
40. 515 F. Supp. 2d 509, 525 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
41. Id. at 514.
42. Id. at 528.
43. Kenneth A. Plevan & Limor Robinson, The ‘Havana Club’ Decision: An Opportunity to
Reassess the Role of Survey Research in Lanham Act False Advertising Cases, 80 BNA PAT. TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHT J. 398, 401 (2010).
44. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Plevan, Daubert’s Impact on Survey Experts in Lanham Act Litigation,
95 TRADEMARK REP. 596 (May–June, 2005); see also Michael Rappeport, Litigation Surveys – Social
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One respected federal judge has pointed out, in a presentation to
advertising lawyers,45 that the use of surveys introduced in Lanham Act
advertising cases takes “a very different approach from the securities law,”
and that, it is one that is “infinitely more time consuming and more
expensive. It’s more expensive to the parties[, and] . . . it’s time consuming
for the court because virtually no survey is free of challenge . . . . So it’s a
very different approach, and one that I’m not sure makes a lot of sense.”46
Therefore, Judge Rakoff would give federal judges the same degree of
freedom to interpret an advertising claim as they have to interpret the
language in a securities disclosure document.47
While Judge Rakoff’s views seem opposite to those Judge Lasker
expressed in 1976, they can be reconciled by recognizing that in 1976, false
advertising litigation under the Lanham Act was in its infancy. Judge Lasker
acknowledged as much when he observed that “few [Lanham Act cases]
have been brought to our attention which deal with false advertising.”48
By now, there are hundreds of advertising lawsuits, and numerous
reported decisions. It seems reasonable that the federal judges today have
experience in dealing with such issues, and should have as much confidence
today to construe advertising claims as the Federal Trade Commission,
which, as discussed below, considers itself free to construe the meaning of
advertising claims without the assistance of survey evidence.
For these reasons, the Mead Johnson and Pernod Ricard courts were
correct in their approach—if a court finds an advertising communication, in
context, to be reasonably clear and unambiguous, survey evidence should be
inadmissible, foreclosing the “misleading,” or implied claim, challenge
prong. However, in both Mead Johnson and Pernod Ricard, packaging
communications were at issue. In the context of advertising with a greater
degree of non-verbal images and communications, it will be more likely that
a court will find the message to the intended audience to be ambiguous,
leaving the challenger free to rely on survey evidence to show that an implied
message was communicated.
Science as Evidence, 92 TM REPORTER 957, at 961, n.11 (July–Aug. 2002) (decrying survey experts who
critique the surveys of others for litigation and invariably “talk glibly of ‘fatal flaws’”).
45. See Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Judge Rakoff Criticizes ‘Peculiarities’ of The Lanham Act,
LAW360, Sept. 30, 2013, http://www.law360.com/articles/476777/judge-rakoff-criticizes-peculiaritiesof-the-lanham-act.
46. Id.
47. Note that while this paper refers to federal judges because virtually all Lanham Act lawsuits
are litigated in federal court, the Lanham Act does not provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction, and,
accordingly, Lanham Act lawsuits could theoretically be litigated in state court as well. 15 U.S.C. § 1121
(2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).
48. Am. Brands Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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10. Pleading Standards for Alleged False Implied Claims; Impact of
Twombly/Iqbal
As is now widely known, the Supreme Court recently, in what is often
referred to as Twombly/Iqbal, made a dramatic change in the Rule 8
standards for pleading.49 In federal court, causes of action must be
“plausible” to survive a motion to dismiss, and there is no doubt that these
new pleading standards apply to Lanham Act cases.50
A recent decision in the Tenth Circuit applied the Twombly/Iqbal
plausibility standards to affirm the dismissal of a Lanham Act complaint
alleging the defendants’ advertising was misleading on the grounds that the
complaint failed to cite any survey or any other evidence of consumer
interpretation. In Vincent v. Utah Plastic Surgery Society,51 several
“cosmetic” surgeons filed antitrust and false advertising claims against a
trade association of “plastic” surgeons, and the district court granted a
motion to dismiss. On appeal, plaintiffs relied on legal principles that set
forth standards for alleging and proving that a challenged literal claim was
false. The appellate panel found this argument “unnecessary to address”
because “Plaintiffs’ complaint does not allege Defendants’ statements are
literally false, either on their face or by necessary implication.”52 Turning to
the alleged false implied claims, the court held that the allegations were
“wholly unsupported by even a single relevant fact.”53 In a footnote, the
decision flatly rejected the argument that plaintiffs should be permitted “to
produce consumer reaction surveys if they are necessary,” observing that
plaintiffs “have not indicated that they possess any such surveys,” citing
Twombly.54
Utah Plastic Surgery Society was designated non-binding precedent,
and it remains to be seen if other courts applying the Lanham Act will follow
the reasoning in that case. The decision points to raising the bar for lawsuits
asserting that an implied-claim was misleading, as it requires the
communication survey to have been completed before the lawsuit begins.
While there was no allegation of literal falsity in Utah Plastic Surgery
Society, the logic of the opinion suggests that if a plaintiff asserts both
theories in a complaint, the implied-claim allegations should, in the absence
49. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009).
50. See, e.g., Hall v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 705 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
51. No. 13–4146, 2015 WL 5090868 (10th Cir. Aug. 31, 2015) (non-binding precedent).
52. Id. at *3
53. Id.
54. Id. at *3, n.7.
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of survey evidence, be dismissed at the pleading stage even if the allegations
based on literal claims are not dismissed. Of course, nothing in the decision
necessarily suggests that if the lawsuit is not dismissed completely, the
implied-claim allegations should be dismissed with prejudice. The Vincent
decision could also have a significant impact if applied in the consumer class
action context, as misleading allegations unsupported by survey evidence are
common in putative consumer class action complaints.
B. Role of Consumer Research in State Law Consumer Deception
Lawsuits
The recent explosion of consumer deception lawsuits brought as
putative class actions, filed by private plaintiffs under state consumer
protection laws, has led to increased use of surveys, in order to address
factors relevant to merits and class certification issues. As discussed below,
these surveys often explore issues other than what the message was
communicated. Moreover, it is worth noting that one Federal Appeals panel
recently observed that “the considerable body of federal common law
construing the [Lanham] Act is instructive in construing the state laws”
proscribing false or misleading advertising.55
1. Determination of Whether a Reasonable Consumer May Have
Been Misled
As noted, under the Lanham Act, to challenge a non-literal message
allegedly communicated typically requires survey evidence showing that the
message was actually received by the intended audience. Under state
consumer protection statutes, the comparable issue appears to be whether the
challenged statement deceived the “reasonable consumer.” If so, not only
does the plaintiff consumer have a valid claim, but the issue could also be
seen as one common across the class for purposes of arguing class
certification.
As discussed below, under the Lanham Act, a survey showing that 25%
to 30% of consumers in a properly conducted survey received an implied
(and false) message would normally be sufficient to support a finding that an
advertising message was misleading. In a consumer class action, the
equivalent percentage will presumably be far higher, perhaps 60% or even
higher, because the class plaintiff is typically seeking class-wide damages,
not merely an injunction. Moreover, for a consumer class action in federal

55.

In re GNC Corp., 789 F. 3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2015).
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court, a claimed consumer communication that is facially implausible may
well not survive a motion to dismiss based on the Twombly/Iqbal
requirement that allegations be plausible.56
In Haskell v. Time, Inc.,57 the ubiquitous mailings from Publisher’s
Clearing House offering sweepstake opportunities for individuals who
purchased magazine or book subscriptions were at issue. Noting that
plaintiff primarily relied on the declarations of a few qualifying customers,
the court pointed to the absence of “consumer survey evidence indicating
that a significant portion of the population has been misled by defendants’
bulletins.”58 The court concluded that “[p]laintiff has therefore failed to
prove that defendants’ statements [misled] the reasonable consumer.”59
In Rahman v. Mott’s LLP,60 a consumer class action, plaintiff
challenged the “No Sugar Added” statement on a food product label.
Plaintiff argued that this statement, while literally true, had misled him into
believing that the product, apple juice, “was lower in sugar and calories than
comparable brands.”61 On defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the
court addressed defendant’s contention that no reasonable consumer would
have been misled by the “No Sugar Added” label. Given that the challenged
label statement was literally true, the court held that plaintiff must introduce
some additional evidence in order to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether
a reasonable consumer would be misled by the labeling on Mott’s 100%
Apple Juice. The testimony of a single consumer in a putative class of
potentially millions is not enough to meet this burden.62
With that background, the court in Rahman proceeded to review surveyrelated evidence offered by both parties. Defendant’s expert conducted a
survey of consumers, contending that it showed that very few cited a low
level of sugar as a reason for their purchase. In response, plaintiff produced
the report of a survey expert who (i) opined, without survey evidence, that

56. See, e.g., Pelayo v. Nestle USA, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 2d 973 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013)(providing
several definitions for the term “All Natural” proffered by Plaintiff—including that it means not
manufactured, that it is not artificial as defined by the FDA, or that none of the ingredients in a “natural”
product are “synthetic” as defined by the National Organic Program—were all implausible); Kane v.
Chobani, Inc., No. 12-CV-02425-LHK, 2013 WL 5289253, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2013) (rejecting as
“simply not plausible” plaintiffs’ allegation that the use of the phrase “evaporated cane juice” in an
ingredients list communicated that the product only contained natural sugars from milk and fruit with no
added sugars or syrup).
57. 965 F. Supp. 1398 (E.D. Cal. 1997).
58. Id. at 1407–08.
59. Id. at 1408.
60. No. CV 13-3482 SI, 2014 WL 5282106, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2014).
61. Id. at *6.
62. Id. at *9.
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consumers would likely be misled by the challenged label; (ii) criticized the
methodology used in defendant’s survey; and (iii) outlined an approach for
future survey research.63 The court concluded that plaintiff “failed to submit
sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether a reasonable
consumer would be deceived by the ‘No Sugar Added’ statement,” and
granted summary judgment dismissing all claims requiring plaintiff to show
that reasonable consumers had been deceived.64
In In re Conagra Foods, Inc.,65 at issue was a label claim for Wesson
Oils that the products were “100% Natural.” Plaintiffs, in a consumer class
action, challenged the label claim as deceptive, alleging that the products
contained genetically-modified organisms (“GMOs”).66 On plaintiffs’
motion to certify various state classes of purchasers, the court reviewed
survey evidence that plaintiffs relied on to show materiality,67 and accepted
plaintiffs’ position that those surveys tended to show that consumers
regarded the “100% Natural” claim as material to their purchasing decisions.
Observing that the surveys did not directly address the issue of the meaning
of “100% natural” to consumers, the court nevertheless concluded that
“plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing for purposes of class certification
that the ‘100% Natural’ claim is material and that consumers generally
understand it, inter alia, as a representation that Wesson Oils do not contain
GMOs.”68
In Suchanek v. Strum Foods, Inc.,69 at issue were the individual coffee
pods used in the popular Keurig single-serve coffeemakers. The defendants
allegedly entered the market with a compatible pod but, due to patent
protection, first introduced a pod containing mostly instant coffee, rather
than fresh ground coffee. The packaging stated that defendants’ pods
contained “naturally roasted soluble and microground Arabica Coffee,” but
“soluble” coffee meant instant coffee, and the pods contained very little
“microground” coffee.70 Plaintiffs contended that consumers were deceived
into believing that they were purchasing fresh ground coffee.71
In concluding that the class should have been certified, the Seventh
Circuit panel in Suchanek reviewed “[n]umerous expert surveys in the record
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at *10.
Id.
90 F. Supp. 3d 919 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
Id. at 939.
Id. at 1018.
Id. at 1019.
764 F.3d 750, 762 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 753.
Id. at 753–54.
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[which] concluded that few consumers understood the true nature of
[defendants’] product.”72 In a survey conducted by one of plaintiffs’ experts,
only 14% of participants identified defendants’ product as containing instant
coffee.73 The defendants’ survey reached a similar result.74 On the issue of
whether the challenged package was likely to mislead a reasonable
consumer, the court concluded: “At least three independent expert surveys,
all employing different methodologies, found that consumers were confused
about the product. A jury should have decided the question whether the
packaging was likely to mislead reasonable consumers.”75
In Yumul v. Smart Balance, Inc.,76 the plaintiff sought to represent a
class of purchasers of Smart Balance Nucoa margarine, promoted as
“cholesterol free,” but allegedly contained artificial trans-fat.
On
defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court cited and discussed several cases in
which a court dismissed complaints on the basis of concluding that the
challenged statements could not, as a matter of law, mislead reasonable
consumers. Here, however, the court concluded that it was “appropriate to
permit plaintiff to attempt to ‘demonstrate by extrinsic evidence, such as
consumer survey evidence, that the challenged statements tend to mislead
consumers,’” and therefore, the motion to dismiss with prejudice was
denied.77
In Gaston v. Schering-Plough Corp.,78 the plaintiff filed a consumer
class action contending, inter alia, that a Schering product, Coppertone Sport
SPF 30 Sunblock, contained false label claims that the product was a
“UVA/UVB sunblock.” The plaintiff alleged that the product provided
insignificant protection from the sun’s harmful UVA rays. In ordering that
the class be certified, the Court of Appeals panel relied on a consumer survey
that showed that 77% of sunscreen users believed that the term “sunblock”
meant protection from “most/all” of the sun’s harmful rays, and that there
was accordingly a common question among class members.79
In McCabe v. Crawford, the court noted that surveys, “similar to ones
used in trademark cases,” were valuable in showing whether a collection
letter was confusing to the unsophisticated consumer in violation of the Fair

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 753.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 762.
733 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
Id. at 1129 (citation omitted).
No. B214935, 2011 WL 3452398 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Aug. 9, 2011, as modified Aug. 25, 2011).
Id at *12.
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Debt Collection Practices Act.80 Citing Seventh Circuit precedent, the court
concluded that the “overall message appears to be that on a defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, if all a plaintiff has to go on is the language
of the collection letter, he ultimately must lose.”81
2. Other Class Certification Issues
In the discussion above, the surveys were similar to Lanham Act
consumer communication surveys evaluating the meaning of a challenged
advertising statement. In the discussion below, the surveys address related
but different issues more relevant to the issue of class certification.
In Algarin v. Maybelline, LLC,82 the court based a number of its class
certification findings on a consumer survey testing consumer satisfaction and
consumer motivations and expectations in purchasing the cosmetics at issue,
which were allegedly falsely advertised as lasting for a full twenty-four hours
when they actually did not. Based on the survey results, the court found that
the class was not sufficiently ascertainable because a number of purchasers
had no expectations with regard to product duration or believed the products
would last less than twenty-four hours, and therefore were uninjured.83 The
court further found commonality lacking due to the variety of duration
expectations, as well as variances in consumer expectations, motivations,
and satisfaction.84
A survey was used in Fairbanks v. Farmers New World Life Insurance
Co.85 to defeat a showing of materiality. In that case, defendants relied on a
survey commissioned by plaintiff’s counsel, in which 500 policyholders
were asked if they would have purchased their policies had it been disclosed
that the policies were not permanent. A total of 47.4% of the respondents
said they would still have purchased the policies.86 Citing the survey results,
the court found that the materiality issue was subject to individual proof, and
affirmed the lower court’s denial of class certification.87
At issue in Astiana v. Kashi Co. were consumer deception claims
asserted under California law challenging “Nothing Artificial” and “All
Natural” statements on food products. On plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

272 F. Supp. 2d 736, 745 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
Id. at 745.
300 F.R.D. 444, 453–54, 457 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
Id.
Id. at 564–66.
197 Cal. App. 4th 544 (July 13, 2011, as modified, Aug. 1, 2011).
Id. at 555.
Id. at 565–66.
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of California purchasers, defendant cited to (i) a “marketing survey” that
showed that consumers equated “natural” with “organic,” and (ii) many of
the ingredients challenged as not natural were accepted as “organic.”88
Relying, inter alia, on this evidence, the court only certified classes based on
ingredients that defendant conceded were not organic.89 In a decision issued
the same day, the same judge ruled similarly in a lawsuit in which plaintiffs
sought to represent a California class of purchasers of Bear Naked food
products labelled as “100% Pure and Natural” or “100% Natural,” relying in
part on similar consumer research.90
In Ackerman v. Coca Cola Co., plaintiffs challenged advertising for
“vitaminwater” which was promoted as a “nutrient-enhanced” water
beverage. In opposition to plaintiffs’ motion to certify classes of New York
and California consumers, defendants offered a consumer survey, among
other expert analyses, “to demonstrate that consumers have, inter alia, many
opportunities to be exposed to information about the sugar and calorie
content of vitaminwater, many different reasons for buying vitaminwater,
wide variations in awareness of vitaminwater’s sugar and calorie content,
and varying notions of what is ‘healthy.’”91 Plaintiffs, in turn, sought
exclusion of the survey with a Daubert challenge. The magistrate judge
deferred consideration of those issues, finding that to the extent “these expert
reports are relevant, it is to the question of whether a reasonable consumer
would find vitaminwater’s labeling or marketing misleading or deceptive,
which is a merits-based inquiry.”92 To put this holding in perspective, the
court had recommended certification of only injunctive, not damages,
classes.93
In a lawsuit challenging as deceptive advertising of the health benefits
of pomegranate juice, In re POM Wonderful LLC Marketing & Sales
Practices Litigation, the court found that the commonality of the materiality
issue was satisfied by survey evidence that showed “a significant majority of
respondents, in excess of 90%, cited health reasons as a motivating factor
behind their purchase of Pom juice.”94 Another court noted that “survey
information could substantiate Plaintiffs’ claim that there are shared legal
88. Astiana v. Kashi Co., 291 F.R.D. 493, 508 (S.D. Cal. 2013).
89. Id. at 509.
90. Thurston v. Bear Naked, Inc., No. 11-CV-2985-H BGS, 2013 WL 5664985, at *8 (S.D. Cal.
July 30, 2013).
91. Ackerman v. Coca Cola Co., No. 09 CV 395 DLI RML, 2013 WL 7044866, at *22 (E.D.N.Y.
July 18, 2013).
92. Id. at *23.
93. Id.
94. No. ML 10-02199 DDP, 2012 WL 4490860, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012).
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issues among the class members with respect to all or some of [the products
at issue].”95 In another case, the survey evidence offered to show common
class issues was rejected for not addressing the proper issues.96
In Beltran v. Avon Products, Inc.,97 at issue were plaintiff’s allegations,
on behalf of a putative consumer class, that Avon had misrepresented
whether any of its products were tested on animals. In its opposition to
plaintiff’s motion for class certification, Avon submitted a declaration from
a marketing professor who, based on an analysis of Avon’s assessment of its
customer base, including information from business consumer research,
opined that the issues were not properly the subject of class certification.98
3. Possible Ethical Issue
In many of these state-law consumer deception cases, the defendant
conducted a pre-certification survey among putative members of the class.
While there are arguably ethical issues when opposing counsel directly
communicates with putative class members without prior notice, none of the
cited cases have raised any ethical issues. One published analysis contends
that there should be no ethical concern.99
C. Surveys in Other Jurisdiction
1. Surveys in Federal Trade Commission Proceedings
In 1972, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) held in In re Pfizer100
that an advertiser must have a “reasonable basis” for making objective claims
and that an advertiser must possess substantiation, prior to running the ad,
for affirmative product claims. Under these cases, if an advertisement
includes an express or implied statement of support for a claim (e.g.,
“surveys show,” “doctors recommend,” “tests prove”), the advertiser must
possess the requisite support before making the claim. With regard to

95. Vallabharpurapu v. Burger King Corp., 276 F.R.D. 611, 616 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
96. In re Front Loading Washing Mach. Class Action Litig., No. 08-51(FSH), 2013 WL 3466821
(D.N.J. July 10, 2013) (refusing to allow survey expert to testify where questions did not elicit response
indicating whether or not survey responders had the same mold and odor issues as plaintiffs).
97. 867 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
98. Beltran v. Avon Products, Inc., ECF 97-1, Redacted Declaration of Dr. Joel Steckel in Support
of Defendant Avon Products, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification.
99. Kenneth A. Plevan & Xiyin Tang, Consumer Research Among Class Members—Is There an
Ethical Issue?, 104 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION REPORT (2013).
100. 81 F.T.C. 23, 29 (1972).
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consumer surveys offered for non-substantiation purposes, the FTC accepts
surveys as evidence of both materiality, and for purposes of interpretation.101
With respect to implied messages, the FTC does not require extrinsic
evidence in the form of a survey to determine the meaning of an
advertisement, as the FTC often considers an implied claim to be reasonably
clear from the face of the advertising.102 The FTC has noted that this
approach of evaluating an advertisement containing an implied claim by
examining the face of the advertisement is “primarily useful in evaluating
advertisements whose language or depictions are clear enough . . . for us to
conclude with confidence after examining the interaction of all the different
elements that they contain a particular implied claim.”103 If the FTC is unable
to determine with confidence what claims are conveyed in a challenged
advertisement, it then turns to extrinsic evidence.104
However, if either party introduces extrinsic evidence, the Commission
will consider that evidence when it reaches its conclusion about the meaning
of the advertisement.105 Thus, for example, in In re POM Wonderful,106 the
Commission considered the extrinsic evidence offered by the parties
including expert testimony, a survey of consumer responses to billboard
headlines, and evidence regarding the intent of Respondents to convey
particular messages.
2. Use of Surveys in NAD Proceedings
Generally speaking, the National Advertising Division (NAD) follows
FTC standards—if reliable, sound survey evidence is submitted, the NAD
will consider it.107 However, the NAD is free to step into the role of the
consumer and independently assess the messages reasonably conveyed by

101. See, e.g., In re Kraft, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 40, 87 (1989) (introducing survey to determine whether
calcium in processed cheese slices was claimed to be important by consumers in their purchasing
decisions); In re ITT Cont’l Baking Co., Inc., 83 F.T.C. 865 (1973) (holding that “market surveys
demonstrating consumer attitudes toward advertised products are relevant to questions of what
representations were made about these products,” but that probative weight will depend on “the particular
facts surrounding the format, methodology, and relevance of the survey questions and design”).
102. See Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d 311, 320 (7th Cir. 1992).
103. In re Thompson Medical Company, 104 F.T.C. 648, 788 (1984).
104. Id. at 788–79.
105. In re Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 319 (1983), aff’d, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984).
106. 2013 WL 268926, at *21 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2013), aff’d, 777 F. 3d 478 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
107. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (Select 55 Beer), NAD Case Report No. 5233, (Oct. 2010),
ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/); CSC Holdings, Inc. (Optimum High Definition Television Services),
NAD Case Report No. 4978, (Mar. 2009), ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/).
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the advertising, either because it has rejected a survey for unreliability or
because no survey has been submitted.108
D. Issue of Whether Surveys Can Be Used to Determine Whether an
Advertising Claim Is Puffery
Puffery is advertising that typically consists of vague or highly
subjective representations, often about product superiority, on which no
reasonable consumer would rely.109 At least one court has held that
communication surveys serve no purpose in deciding whether a challenged
claim constitutes puffery.110 The Eighth Circuit held that because puffery is
not actionable, permitting communication surveys to determine whether
such a claim is misleading might “blind-side[]” an advertiser and subject it
to “a wholly unanticipated claim the advertisement’s plain language would
not support.”111 Surveys are inappropriate to establish that a claim of puffery
is misleading, because the nature of puffery is vague, “and cannot be
reasonably interpreted as providing a benchmark by which the veracity of
the statement can be ascertained.”112
One district court, nevertheless, held that a survey might be useful to
determine, as a factual matter, whether an advertisement actually constitutes
puffery. In Verizon Directories Corp. v. Yellow Book USA, Inc.,113 the court
determined that this issue “cannot be resolved without surveys, expert
testimony, and other evidence of what is happening in the real world,” and
deferred the resolution for trial.114
E. Use of Surveys to Substantiate Advertising Claims
Consider a claim that states: “When doctors and pharmacists were
asked which they would recommend more often, 8 out of 10 chose PEPCID

108. See Priceline.com, Inc. (Name Your Own Price), NAD Case Report No. 5437, (Mar. 2012),
ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/); Your Baby Can, LLC (Your Baby Can Read Early Language
Development System), NAD/CARU Case Report No. 5313, (Mar. 2011), ASCR (http://casereport.bbb.org/).
109. United Indus. Corp. v. The Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 1998).
110. Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 393 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that
the phrase “America’s Favorite Pasta” cannot be transformed into a specific, measurable claim by nature
of a survey).
111. Id. at 393–94.
112. Id. at 391.
113. 309 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
114. Id. at 407.
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AC Acid Controller over TAGAMET HB.”115
This claim is an
“establishment” claim because it explicitly represents that a survey shows
that professionals prefer the product, and the advertiser, in turn, must have
an appropriate survey to support, or substantiate, this claim.116 Courts have
found that when advertising “makes an ‘establishment claim’, a claim
supported by a test or survey,” the advertisement “will be found to be literally
false if the test or survey relied upon is unreliable or does not in fact support
the claim.”117 Likewise, if a claim implicitly represents that it is supported
by a survey—for example, a claim that “more doctors prefer the patch that
gives you the choice”—the advertiser must also possess the requisite survey
support, even if no actual survey is literally cited in the advertising.118
Claim support surveys, of course, are not communication surveys;
claim support surveys do not determine what messages the intended
audience receives. Such surveys must nonetheless meet the standards and
requisites for reliable survey research.
F. Level of Communication Necessary to Show That a Message is
Implied
1. In General
An issue that often arises with communication surveys is the level of
communication necessary to demonstrate that an implied message is
conveyed. The survey must establish that a “substantial number” of
consumers took away a misleading impression from the disputed
advertisement.119 Surveys demonstrating a 20% communication rate or
higher typically support a finding that there is an implied claim.120 A few
federal court decisions have indicated that 15% to 16% may also be sufficient

115. See SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer
Pharms. Co., Inc., 906 F. Supp. 178, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 100 F.3d 943 (2d Cir. 1996).
116. See Castrol, Inc. v. Quaker State Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that where the
“defendant’s ad explicitly or implicitly represents that tests or studies prove its product superior, plaintiff
satisfies its burden by showing that the tests did not establish the proposition for which they were cited”).
117. SmithKline, 906 F. Supp. at 182.
118. Pharmacia Corp. v. GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare, 292 F. Supp. 2d 594, 607 (D.N.J.
2003).
119. See McNeilab Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 675 F. Supp. 819, 825 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1987,
as amended Dec. 4 and 7, 1987), aff’d, 848 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1988).
120. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Ultreo, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 339, 345 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2008); see
also Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. QIP Holder LLC, 2010 WL 669870, at *19 (D. Conn. Feb. 19, 2010).
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in some circumstances.121 The NAD is unlikely to find sufficient evidence
of deception when a survey reports a rate below 20%.122
Courts have cited to decisions addressing trademark infringement
surveys to support the thresholds for false advertising surveys.123 Recently,
however, the Supreme Court has made it clear that Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act “creates two distinct bases of liability: false association,
§1125(a)(1)(A), and false advertising, §11(a)(1)(B).”124 This language
suggests that analogies to trademark law may be unhelpful unless justified
by a relevant and persuasive analysis.
2. Net Communication (Levels Adjusted by a Control)
A reliable survey typically seeks to filter out survey noise, which can
be created by guessing, pre-conceived views, and/or possible biases in the
survey design or simply by the artifact of a survey. One approach is to recruit
respondents into two groups, a test group and a control group. The
percentage of consumers who reported receiving a certain message is then
calculated by netting out the control group responses from the percentage of
consumers in the test group who received the advertising message at issue.
For example, in Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & JohnsonMerck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co.,125 which considered, inter alia,
whether the name of the product Mylanta Night Time Strength misled
consumers into thinking the product provides all-night relief, the survey
expert presented a survey where the first group was exposed to the Mylanta
Night Time Strength product line as it would appear in retail stores, while
the control group was exposed to a product not at issue in the litigation,
Mylanta Extra Strength. In the first group, approximately 30% of the
respondents expressed their belief that Mylanta Night Time Strength
provided relief that lasted the whole night.126 By contrast, fewer than 5% of
the control respondents believed that Mylanta Extra Strength provided allnight relief.127 After netting out the “noise” of the control group results, the

121. See, e.g., Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co.,
290 F.3d 578, 594 (3d Cir. 2002); In re Spirits Int’l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1356 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
122. See Wal-Mart Stores v. H-E-B Grocery Co., LP, NAD Case Report No. 5032, 10 (June 2009),
ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/).
123. See, e.g., William H. Morris Co. v. Group W, Inc., 66 F.3d 255, 258 (9th Cir. 1995);
CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., No. 10–3542, 2011 WL 1540403, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22,
2011).
124. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1384 (2014).
125. 290 F.3d 578, 590–91 (3d Cir. 2002).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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survey found a 25% confusion rate among respondents that had been misled
into thinking Mylanta Night Time Strength provided all-night relief.128
In McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc.,129 the product at issue, Listerine, was
advertised to be as effective as floss in a series of television commercials,
print ads, and hang tags. The challenger conducted consumer surveys—one
showed consumers a television commercial and asked what their take-away
was, and another showed consumers the Listerine bottle with the label at
issue. As a control, consumers were asked their “pre-existing beliefs”
regarding Listerine and floss; “the intent was to determine the number of
people who did not recall seeing the commercials but who still believed that
Listerine could be used instead of floss.”130 After netting out the “noise”
(19%), the survey experts arrived at a 26% to 31% level of communication
(results in the label and commercial surveys).131
In American Home Products Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
defendant’s survey expert administered two control surveys. In one of these
control surveys, survey participants exposed to an ADVIL television
commercial “indicated that they saw specific superiority claims that ADVIL
lasted longer, acted faster, and was gentler to the stomach when in fact those
specific claims were not advanced in the advertisement.”132 In the other
control survey, “consumers were asked via telephone how long various overthe-counter analgesics lasted, without the benefit of any advertising copy to
review.”133 The expert argued that the surveys showed that a “significant
number of consumers have a general preconception as to [the] duration [of
plaintiff manufacturer’s ADVIL] that is not informed or influenced by any
ALEVE advertisement.”134 The court approvingly cited these two control
surveys to “illuminate the existence of the (unaccounted for) noise in
[plaintiff ADVIL manufacturer’s] survey.”135
In LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.,136 the court refused
to exclude a survey that used as a control a commercial of defendant
Whirlpool advertising another product not at issue, rather than editing the
test commercial. The court noted that although the “control commercial used
different imagery, the commercial aired contemporaneously with the test
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id.
Id.
Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 871 F. Supp. 739, 750 (D.N.J. 1994).
Id. at 749.
Id.
Id. at 749.
661 F. Supp. 2d 940, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2009).

3

Plevan - FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

1/29/16 2:58 PM

2016] USE OF SURVEYS IN ADVERTISING AND CONSUMER DECEPTION DISPUTES

73

commercial and otherwise covered the same Whirlpool product that the test
commercial addressed.”137 While the “differences between the test and the
control may affect the weight that a jury attributes to the study,” such
differences “are insufficient to find the [study] inadmissible.”138
In general, a survey reporting message communication in the lower
range is more likely to constitute acceptable evidence of an implied message
where that percentage reflects the level of communication net of a control
level.139 Similarly, where the survey has not accounted for noise, a
borderline percentage is more likely to be deemed insufficient.140
3. Federal Cases
The lack of a bright-line test for the threshold percentage reflects that a
court is not bound by a survey’s conclusions but is “obliged to judge for itself
whether the evidence or record establishes that others are likely to be misled
or confused.”141 It is well-established that a false advertisement “must
deceive a substantial portion of the relevant customers,”142 and a deception
rate of 20% or higher generally satisfies this standard.143 In the gray area
between 10 to 20%, one court determined that a claim is actionable where
15% of consumers surveyed took away a misleading message.144 As this is
in line with trademark cases holding “that survey evidence of 15% confusion

137. Id.
138. Id. at 956.
139. See Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290
F.3d 578, 594 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 2d 491,
501 (D. Md. 2008) (finding 24% to 33% net deception); Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 1996
WL 717466, at *6, 9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 1996) (finding 23% to 24% net deception sufficient, even if the
survey underestimated the noise by a few percentage points).
140. See Fruit of the Loom, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1986,
amended memorandum and order Oct. 9, 1987) (reporting 18% deception insufficient to establish that
the advertisement was misleading where noise was not taken into account and survey also had
questionable methodology).
141. Tyco Indus., Inc. v. Lego Sys., Inc., No. 84-3201 (GEB), 1987 WL 44363, at *8 (D.N.J. Aug.
26, 1987), aff’d, 853 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1988).
142. In re Spirits Int’l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
143. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Ultreo, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 339, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Cases
have held that 20% constitutes a substantial percentage of consumers.”) (citing Johnson & Johnson-Merck
Consumer Pharms. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Pharms, Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 134 n.14 (3d Cir. 1994)); see
also Sanderson Farms, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 2d at 504 (54.9% “far exceed[s] the level of consumer survey
evidence usually required by courts”); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Loew’s Theatres, Inc., 511 F. Supp.
867, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that 25% is not insubstantial).
144. Novartis, 290 F.3d at 594 (holding that survey results showing 15% deception supported a
likelihood of success on the merits); see also Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods., Inc. v. Neutrogena
Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 266, 275 (D. Del. 2010); Sanderson Farms, 547 F. Supp. at 504.
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is sufficient to demonstrate actual confusion,”145 it may be that these opinions
equated the two legal doctrines, without any discussion as to whether the two
analyses should be comparable.
Courts are unlikely to find deception levels below 10% sufficient
evidence of deception. The Ninth Circuit has rejected deception rates well
below 10% as too small a percentage to support a finding of likely consumer
deception.146 Similarly, the Third Circuit has opined that a 7.5% rate did not
constitute a substantial number of consumers.147
4. NAD Cases
The threshold for establishing an implied claim before the NAD appears
to be somewhat more clearly defined than in federal court. The NAD has
generally considered a communication level at or above 20% adequate,148
with survey evidence demonstrating that 29% of consumer respondents took
away a message “too high to be ignored.”149
NAD appears less likely to find that an advertisement conveys a
message where a survey reports a communication rate below 20% and has
recognized 15% as “more the exception rather than the rule.”150 For example,
in Nextel Communications, Inc. (Nextel Direct Connect/Calling Plans), the
NAD combined its own impression that the advertisement appeared truthful
with a survey reporting consumer deception of 12% to find that the
advertisement was not misleading.151 In another matter, NAD determined
that a survey reporting deception of 13.3% and 9.4% on various claims, in
addition to its own analysis of the advertisements, did not establish
deception, particularly where the net deception levels were 2.9% and 1.9%
145. Novartis, 290 F.3d at 594; see also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Customer Co., 947 F. Supp. 422,
425 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (citing multiple cases that considered a 15% confusion rate to be evidence of
likelihood of confusion).
146. William H. Morris Co. v. Group W, Inc., 66 F.3d 255, 258 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that less
than 3% is not significant); see also Diana Princess of Wales Mem’l Fund v. Franklin Mint Co., 216 F.3d
1082, 1999 WL 1278044, at *2 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (rejecting false advertising
claim on the same evidence as the false advertising claim, which failed partially because 6.9% was
deemed insufficient evidence of actual confusion).
147. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms., Inc., 19
F.3d 125, 135–36 (3d Cir. 1994).
148. Wal-Mart Stores v. H-E-B Grocery Co., LP, NAD Case Report No. 5032, 10 (June 2009),
ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/) (not finding evidence of deception where net confusion rate was
always below 18% and generally between 10% and 13%).
149. Kimberly Clark Corporation (Kleenex Ultra Tissue), NAD Case Report No. 3207, 4 (June
1995), ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/).
150. Wal-Mart Stores v. H-E-B Grocery Co., LP, NAD Case Report No. 5032, 10 (June 2009),
ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/).
151. Nextel Communications, Inc. (Nextel Direct Connect/Calling Plans), NAD Case Report No.
3934, 13–14 (July 2002), ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/).
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respectively after factoring in noise, and where the methodology and
tabulation of the net results were questionable.152
5. Surveys Measuring False Implied Claims Communicated by a
Trademark or Brand Name
A brand product name or trademark itself can communicate a false
message. For example, in Novartis Consumer Health v. Johnson &
Johnson,153 the Third Circuit found that the product name “Mylanta Night
Time Strength” was misleading because it implied all-night relief. In that
case, the court determined that even a 15% confusion rate would be
sufficient, citing a number of cases, including Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana
Products, Inc.,154 in the false advertising context.155
Similarly, the NAD has stated that it does not give special deference to
product names, for “the mere fact that [a claim] appears on packaging as part
of the product’s name does not insulate it from a review of its truth and
accuracy.”156 In Church & Dwight Co., Inc., the NAD recommended a name
change based on its own interpretation of a “4x” concentration claim, which
the NAD found was likely to cause consumer confusion by conveying the
unsupported message that the advertiser’s products are four times more
concentrated than competing products.157 However, the NAD has also stated
that mere speculation by an advertiser that a product name may be
misleading is not enough for the NAD to require an advertiser to change a
product name—the challenger must submit extrinsic evidence in the form of
a reliable, well-conducted consumer survey.158
6. Jury Instructions
Where a jury is evaluating an alleged implied claim, the court will likely
not provide the jury in the jury instructions with a percentage threshold for
finding confusion. For example, in Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc. v. Del
152. MillerCoors, LLC (Advertising for Miller Lite Beer), NAD Case Report No. 5129, 6 (Dec.
2009), ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/); see also Alamo Rent-A-Car (Alamo Rental Cars), NAD Case
Report No. 3124, 3 (July 1994) ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/).
153. 290 F.3d 578 (3d Cir. 2002).
154. 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 1982), superseded by statute, FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a), as recognized
in Johnson & Johnson v. GAC Int’l, Inc., 862 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1988).
155. Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290 F.3d
578, 594 (3d Cir. 2002).
156. Church & Dwight Co., Inc. (Arm & Hammer Liquid Laundry Detergents) NAD Case Report
No. 5658, (Dec. 2013), ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/).
157. Id.
158. Bausch & Lomb Inc. (ReNu with MoistureLoc), NAD Case Report No. 4385 (Aug. 2005),
ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/).
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Monte Foods Co., a 2012 jury trial involving an alleged misleading
promotion of packaged fruit, the court gave jurors the standard instruction
that it was up to them to decide what, if any, weight to give to the testimony
of the expert survey witnesses.159 While the court presented a list of factors
that the jurors could find useful to consider—including, for example,
whether the survey questions asked were non-leading and whether the survey
had been conducted among a representative sample of the universe of
consumers—it did not provide a percentage threshold.160
G. Foundation Evidence
In support of the admissibility of survey evidence, the proponent must
lay a proper foundation, lest a court exclude the survey as not qualifying for
an exception to the hearsay rule. An example of an improperly-laid
foundation is found in Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc.161
The dispute there centered on two competing, purported anti-wrinkle
creams, one prescription and the other cosmetic. The challenger attempted
to introduce three pre-litigation market research surveys that supposedly
showed the vast majority of consumers were aware of Retin-A’s use for the
treatment of photo-aged skin.162 The challenger argued that the surveys were
admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.163 The
court, however, found that the surveys lacked an adequate foundation—
namely, that the sponsoring witness was a “person with knowledge” within
the meaning of the rule.164 The witness testified that Ortho regularly
conducted market research and commissioned such research by hiring
independent contractors.165 The court nevertheless found that the witness did
not personally commission the work, did not play any role in its preparation,
did not see the original data, and lacked knowledge of the steps that the
outside survey contractor took in preparing the report.166 Therefore, the court
excluded the surveys as hearsay.167

159. No. 1:08-cv-08718-SHS (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2008).
160. Id.; see also Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc. v. Del Monte Foods Co., 933 F. Supp. 2d 655
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
161. 828 F. Supp. 1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d, 32 F.3d 690 (2d Cir. 1994).
162. Id. at 1118.
163. Id.; FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
164. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 828 F. Supp. at 1119.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1121.
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H. Proving Damages with Survey Evidence
As noted, if a communication survey determines only the message
received by the target audience, then presumably something more is needed
to show a diversion of sales, such as damages.
Under the Lanham Act, a challenger must meet a higher standard to
recover damages than to obtain an injunction, often referred to as the need to
show causation.168 Of course, a survey can help demonstrate causation by
showing that the implied message has affected purchase decisions, but for
this, the survey must go beyond measuring communication.169
It is interesting to consider that a survey showing net communication of
30%, for example, may be considered sufficient to obtain an injunction if the
implied claim is shown to be false. However, in this example, arguably 70%
of the members of the target audience were not confused, thus undercutting
any damages claim.
III. SPECIFIC ISSUES IN THE DESIGN OF COMMUNICATION SURVEYS
AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
No matter how well a party thinks its communications survey is
designed, an expert for the opposing party will invariably opine that it is
“fatally flawed.”170 This section examines a number of the more frequently
litigated issues relating to the design of communication surveys. Design
shortcomings can affect the weight accorded to survey results,171 as well as
lead to the exclusion of the survey.172
168. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1392 (2014)
(“Even when a plaintiff cannot quantify its losses with sufficient certainty to recover damages, it may still
be entitled to injunctive relief . . . .”); TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 831 (9th Cir.
2011) (affirming denial of damage award where plaintiff failed to provide any proof of causation);
Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 318 (1st Cir. 2002) (“In order to
prove causation under § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, the aggrieved party must demonstrate that the false
advertisement actually harmed its business.”); Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186,
191 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that inability to show lost sales does not bar injunctive relief, though it would
bar monetary relief).
169. See Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc. v. Nutro Prods., Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1212 (D. Kan. 2003)
(holding that plaintiff was unable to show that it had been injured where survey only showed consumer
deception, but not how it influenced purchasing decisions or loss of sales).
170. See, e.g., Rappeport, supra note 44, at 96, n.11 (decrying survey experts who critique the
surveys of others for litigation and invariably “talk glibly of ‘fatal flaws’”).
171. See, e.g., Bruce Lee Enters., LLC v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 10 CV. 2333 (KMW), 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 31155, at *65 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013) (“The evidentiary value of a survey’s results rests upon
the underlying objectivity of the survey itself.” (internal citations omitted)).
172. See Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Systems, Inc., No. 10-cv-01221-PAB-CBS, 2012 WL 2153162, at
*11 (D. Colo. June 13, 2012) (“‘It is the trial court’s responsibility to determine the probative value of a
consumer survey, and it is appropriate for the trial court to accord little or no weight to a defective
survey.’”) (citing Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Olymco, Inc., 1995 WL 499466, at *12 (6th Cir. 1995)); Procter &
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As a consequence of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.173
and its progeny, as well as Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the district courts
are authorized to act as “gatekeepers” with respect to all expert testimony.
That necessarily led to the question of what the post-Daubert standards
would be for surveys offered in Lanham Act cases. In a leading case
addressing that issue, Schering Corp. v. Pfizer, Inc.,174 the Second Circuit
firmly established the majority rule that generally, most alleged defects in
survey methodology go to the credibility, and not the admissibility, of a
survey, and thus surveys should rarely be excluded from evidence in Lanham
Act cases.
Plaintiff Schering, the manufacturer of Claritin, concerned that a
competitor was misrepresenting the non-sedative properties of a competing
prescription drug, commissioned a survey among physicians whom the
competitor’s representatives visited.175 The survey allegedly confirmed that
false claims were being delivered, and Schering filed a false advertising
Lanham Act lawsuit, which ended with a settlement.176 Schering then
conducted additional surveys to monitor compliance with the terms of the
settlement, and filed a second lawsuit based on the survey results.177 In the
course of discovery, plaintiff found surveys commissioned by the
competitor, and moved for a preliminary injunction, citing in support a total
of five surveys.178 The district court granted defendants’ Daubert motion to
exclude the five surveys, and denied the preliminary injunction.179
On plaintiff’s appeal, the Second Circuit held that several of the surveys
should have been considered, and remanded for reconsideration of the
admissibility of the others.180 To reach this result, Judge (later Justice)
Sotomayor conducted an exhaustive analysis of the exceptions to the hearsay
rule pursuant to which survey evidence can be admitted.181 On the issue of

Gamble Pharms., Inc. v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 0034 (PAC), 2006 WL 2588002, at *27
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) (“A survey is considered to be properly conducted if the survey was fairly and
scientifically conducted by qualified experts and impartial interviewers . . ., if the questions upon which
the results relied do not appear to be misleading or biased, and if the recordation of responses was handled
in a completely unbiased manner.”) (quoting Gilbert/Robinson, Inc. v. Carrie Beverage-Missouri, Inc.,
758 F. Supp. 512, 524 (E.D. Mo. 1991)).
173. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
174. 189 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 1999).
175. Id. at 222.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 222–23.
178. Id. at 223.
179. Id. at 221.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 227–39.
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surveys considered under the state-of-mind exception in Rule 803(3) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the court held that “errors in methodology . . .
properly go only to the weight of the evidence—subject, of course, to Rule
403’s more general prohibition against evidence that is less probative than
prejudicial or confusing.”182
A. Property Defined Universe
A threshold question in survey design is whether the survey’s “universe
was properly defined.”183 Among other concerns, this means that those
taking the survey must fall within the group of the advertised product’s target
customers.
1. Surveying The Target Audience
The proper survey universe refers to “that segment of the population
whose perceptions and state of mind are relevant to the issues in the case.”184
Essentially, those taking the survey must be within the group expected to
purchase the advertised product or service. This is because a respondent who
is not a potential candidate to purchase the product will not likely have any
interest in the product’s promotion. Therefore, the respondent will be more
likely to give unthinking or flippant responses to the survey questions. Such
a respondent also may not have a sufficient understanding of the product’s
market context to provide meaningful or useful responses.
Courts have noted that advertising surveys polling the wrong universe
have little probative value.185 “[E]ven if the proper questions are asked in a
proper manner, if the wrong persons are asked, the results are likely to be
irrelevant.”186 The universe should be defined so that survey respondents
represent “the person[s] to whom the advertisement is addressed” and can
answer questions such as “what does the public perceive the message to

182. Id. at 228.
183. See LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 661 F. Supp. 2d 940, 952 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (listing
criteria for evaluating the “trustworthiness of survey evidence”) (quoting Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc. v.
Stouffer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1259, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
184. PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 123 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:159 (4th ed. 2003)).
185. Id.; Kwan Software Eng’g, Inc. v. Foray Techs., LLC, No. C 12-03762 SI, 2014 WL 572290,
at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2014); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1328 (N.D. Ga.
2008).
186. 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:159
(4th ed. 2015).
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be?”187 This can be accomplished by targeting the survey toward the
advertiser’s customer base.188 Surveys that have left out defendants’ primary
customers have an improper universe.189
2. Prospective Purchasers Versus Past Purchasers
There has been debate about whether a properly defined universe
should be limited to prospective purchasers, or include past purchasers as
well. What complicates the issue is the frequency of repurchase. To
illustrate the issue, consider a consumer of a product that is typically used or
consumed frequently, such as a soft drink. Regular consumers of soft drinks
are likely to continue purchasing the product frequently, and therefore recent
past purchasers are in the target market. By contrast, a recent purchaser of a
more durable item, such as a refrigerator, will likely not be in the market for
a new one for many years. Therefore, a recent purchaser of a refrigerator will
not likely find advertisements for refrigerators to be of any interest.
Several courts have held that the proper universe includes both groups,
particularly where past purchasers are likely to buy the product again.190
Others, however, have discounted surveys that included past purchasers but
left out prospective purchasers. For example, in Merisant Co. v. McNeil
Nutritionals, LLC, the court noted that it is typical to survey prospective
consumers, and held that the survey proponent did not sufficiently explain
why past users were in the appropriate universe in that case.191
The survey need not match the advertising audience precisely, as the
survey will be admissible if the survey respondents represented a
“sufficiently close approximation of the recipient pool.”192 However,

187. Gillette Co. v. Norelco Consumer Prods. Co., 69 F. Supp. 2d 246, 258 (D. Mass. 1999) (quoting
Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 297–98
(2d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted)).
188. KIS, S.A. v. Foto Fantasy, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (properly
conforming survey participant group to demographics supplied by the defendant and to those segments
of the population whom the expert saw using or showing interest in defendants’ Portrait Studio).
189. Id. at 972.
190. See Millennium Importing Co. v. Sidney Frank Importing Co., No. 03-5141 (JRT/FLN), 2004
WL 1447915, at *8–9 (D. Minn. June 11, 2004) (properly including past purchasers of vodka who were
likely to purchase vodka again, where the universe was further limited to respondents who indicated they
were likely to read one of the magazines in which the ad was printed).
191. 242 F.R.D. 315, 322 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
192. PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 123–24 (4th Cir. 2011) (lower court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert’s online consumer survey about infant formula where
the respondents were “located by a third party” and “pre-screened to ensure that they were (1) new parents
or expecting a baby in the next six months, (2) were open to considering purchasing infant formula, (3)
were not participating in the Women, Infants, and Children Nutrition Program, and (4) were or would be
the primary or shared decision maker in choosing infant formula brands”).
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selection of survey locations should not unfairly favor one party over the
other. For example, a mall survey was held to have a properly defined
universe where it was conducted at a neutral location, a mall in which neither
party had a presence.193
B. Representative Sample
Selecting the appropriate sample of respondents is crucial to survey
implementation, because the reactions of the polled sample should attempt
to represent the genuine reactions of the defined universe.194
1. Screening Questionnaire
The evidentiary value of a communication survey also depends on
whether the survey screens users to properly define the survey’s universe.195
Therefore, respondents are typically screened before answering substantive
communication questions in order to make sure that they qualify for the
survey, and courts have found a failure to do so undercuts the legitimacy of
the entire survey.196 One reason for screening is to ensure that respondents
do not have biases that would affect the accuracy of the survey, such as
employment by the company whose product is being advertised.
Respondents are also screened out if they do not fall within the proper
universe of potential consumers of the advertised product.197
2. Sample Size and Probability Sampling
If the sample is too small, survey results might not properly measure
the meaning average consumers perceived, and courts will generally give

193. Foto Fantasy, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d at 972.
194. See MCCARTHY, supra note 186.
195. See, e.g., Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 384, 447 (D.N.J.
June 5, 2009) (holding that a survey was improperly conducted in part because it failed to use survey
questions to screen out the correct sample population).
196. Id. (holding respondents were not screened to ensure they were in the correct universe was “a
critical flaw in the design of the survey, which makes it significantly less useful for determining whether
consumers who were making the actual purchasing decision were deceived, a critical question in this
case”).
197. See Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290
F.3d 578, 591 (3d Cir. 2002).
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less weight to the survey.198 Between 200 and 300 participants is often
considered an adequate sample size for a communication survey.199
Nonprobability sampling is common.200 However, surveys that utilize
probability sampling, such as telephone surveys, were traditionally preferred
because probability sampling meant that each possible respondent had an
equal chance of being selected.201 One common, traditional way to conduct
a nonprobability sampling survey is the “mall intercept” method.202 In a
national survey, the survey expert will typically select malls in
geographically diverse areas of the country, for example four malls in each
of the four census regions—Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. Mall
surveys are routinely accepted for communication surveys.203
3. Internet Surveys
Nonprobability sampling may also be conducted through internet
surveys, a method which numerous courts have now accepted for
communication surveys.204 Courts review internet surveys with the same
emphasis on relevant questions and technical adequacy as they use when

198. See, e.g., Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Bluesky Med. Corp., SA-03-CA-0832, 2006 WL 6505346,
at *5 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2006) (holding that a different court holding the sample size too small in a
survey of 52 participants with only 27 in the test group distinguishable from a sample of 75 physicians
and 60 nurses, which was “sufficiently large to provide meaningful results”).
199. David Bernstein & Bruce Keller, THE LAW OF ADVERTISING, MARKETING AND PROMOTIONS
§ 3.03 (2015) (citing In re Northland Cranberries, Inc., NAD Case Report No. 3948 (Aug. 2002), ASCR
(http://case-report.bbb.org/)).
200. MCCARTHY, supra note 186.
201. See id.
202. See, e.g., Merisant Co. v. McNeil Nutritionals, LLC, 242 F.R.D. 315, 325–26 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(denying motion in limine to exclude survey that employed the mall intercept method using 23 malls
spread out across the country).
203. See Fancaster, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 832 F. Supp. 2d 380, 405 (D.N.J. 2011) (rejecting expert’s
testimony that mall surveys, because they are not projectable, cannot be relied on in litigation, and stating
that courts have repeatedly accepted mall surveys in litigation).
204. See, e.g., T-Mobile US, Inc. v. AIO Wireless LLC, 991 F. Supp. 2d 888, 907 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
3, 2014) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the online presentation of a consumer survey affected its
weight); PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 124 (4th Cir. 2011) (admitting “without
difficulty” an expert testimony based on an internet survey of prescreened individuals who viewed an
advertisement online then dialed a toll-free number to answer questions about it); Doctor’s Assocs. v.
QIP Holder LLC, Civil Action No. 3.06-cv-1710 (VLB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14687, at *56 (D. Conn.
Feb. 19, 2010) (holding that an internet survey that exposed consumers to a 30-second advertisement
followed by a series of questions to assess their reactions was admissible); R&R Partners, Inc. v. Tovar,
447 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1155 (D. Nev. 2006) (rejecting defendant’s argument that internet surveys are
unreliable).
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reviewing the adequacy of phone or in-person surveys, and admit internet
surveys as evidence if these surveys satisfy those same requirements.205
However, monitoring the sample composition in Internet surveys can
be difficult. Without information about the selection of the sample, courts
have criticized survey evidence, whether compiled from internet surveys, as
not probative.206 One court criticized the universe of an AOL poll as
“[p]resumably . . . comprised of people who happened to have been online
while AOL released this poll, and cared enough about the issue to mouseclick on a box,” and described the sample as the “least representative
imaginable.”207
C. Fair Presentation of the Commercial Stimulus
To appropriately test the typical reaction of a consumer, the
presentation of the commercial stimulus should mimic a typical viewing
context.208
There has been debate about the amount of time that survey respondents
should be exposed to visual stimuli, such as print advertisements or product
labels. Courts have emphasized the need to realistically replicate the
market.209 Permitting the respondent to have access to the advertisement

205. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.Com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1246 (10th Cir. 2013) (affirming
the trial court’s exclusion of an online questionnaire, because the questions asked were ambiguous, but
not because the survey was conducted online).
206. See, e.g., In re Front Loading Washing Mach. Class Action Litig., Civil Action No. 08-51
(FSH), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96070, at *21–23 (D.N.J. July 10, 2013) (excluding expert testimony of
an internet survey on reliability grounds because the survey asked only general questions and because the
expert lacked information on whether the respondents received compensation, how many respondents
there were, whether each response was from a unique individual or whether the respondents actually
owned the product at issue); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Ultreo, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 339, 350 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (“There is no indication of whether the universe from which these respondents were chosen was a
properly defined universe, or whether the 3,116 respondents constituted a representative sample of that
universe. Without any information as to the composition and selection methodology of the survey sample,
the [survey] is simply not probative of irreparable injury.”); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp.
2d 1302, 1324-25, 1334-35 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (finding survey did not create a genuine issue of material
fact with respect to consumer confusion where the survey targeted an overbroad universe and used a nonrandom sample).
207. Merisant, 242 F.R.D. at 328 n.11 (internal citations omitted).
208. See POM Wonderful LLC. v. Organic Juice USA, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 188, 200 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (finding the weight of an online survey is diminished where it fails to replicate real world
conditions); Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Management, Inc., 618 F.3d 1025,
1037–38 (9th Cir. 2010) (failing to replicate real world conditions, affecting the weight of the survey
evidence); Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo North America, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 671, 693–94
(W.D. Ky. 2010) (holding survey evidence was not useful or persuasive where the survey created an
environment that was dissimilar to that which a typical consumer would encounter), aff’d, 679 F.3d 410
(6th Cir. 2012).
209. See Church & Dwight Co., Inc. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 893, 910 (D.N.J.
1994) (“In a Lanham Act false advertising case, it is crucial that the survey evidence presented to the trier
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throughout the survey might reduce the survey’s probative value, because
respondents could view the stimulus for unrealistic periods of time.210
However, several decisions have indicated that the stimulus should be visible
to respondents for the duration of the survey.211
With respect to audio-visual stimuli such as television commercials, the
generally accepted practice is to show the stimulus twice to respondents, in
order to ensure the survey is conducted in a “generally objective and fair
manner.”212 Where a video was embedded on a webpage, the “fact that the
respondents were not shown the text from the webpage may severely
undercut the survey’s reliability.”213
D. Question Design
Of considerable importance is the objectivity of the question design—
a fact-specific inquiry that is subject to case-by-case analysis.214 Survey
questions must not be leading or suggestive, and must be designed to probe
whether consumers actually take away the message being tested.215
Courts have cited open-ended questions as preferable to closed-ended
or multiple choice questions,216 but closed-ended or multiple choice
questions have been found to be reliable when filter questions are asked,217
and a “don’t know” or “not sure” choice is included to help avoid guessing
by survey participants.218 Survey design typically provides specific
of fact most closely replicates consumers’ ‘real world’ perceptions of the contested advertisement.”
(emphasis added)).
210. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 871 F. Supp 739, 761 (D.N.J. 1994) (holding
that the survey suffered from “improper technique” because of the “extended time the participant was
permitted to study[,] . . . view[,] and review [the free-standing coupon insert] during the course of the
entire survey interview, which typically lasted from 10 to 15 minutes”); see MCCARTHY, supra note 186
(defining a “reading test”).
211. See, e.g., Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co.,
129 F. Supp. 2d 351, 366 (D.N.J. 2000) (“[L]eaving the products for the respondents to examine rather
than taking the products away replicates market conditions”) (citing Starter Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 170
F.3d 286, 297 (2d Cir. 1999)), aff’d, 290 F.3d 578 (3d Cir. 2002).
212. See, e.g., McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 244–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
213. POM Wonderful, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 200.
214. LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 661 F. Supp. 2d 940, 956 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2009)
(“‘The probative value of any given survey is a fact specific question that is uniquely contextual.’”)
(quoting Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294,
300–01 (2d Cir. 1992)).
215. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
960 F.2d 294, 300 (2d Cir. 1992).
216. See, e.g., id.
217. See, e.g., LG Elecs, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
218. See, e.g., id. (finding the use of closed-ended questions, proper particularly when the questions
included a “don’t know” option); L & F Prods. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 845 F. Supp. 984, 998 (S.D.N.Y.
1994), aff’d, 45 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1995).
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instructions to participants not to guess.219 A survey is “not credible if it relies
on leading questions which are ‘inherently suggestive and invite guessing by
those who did not get any clear message at all.’”220
1. Open-Ended Questions
Communication surveys invariably start with open-ended questions that
make broad general inquiries such as “What was the main message of the
advertisement?” or “Aside from trying to get you to buy the product, what
are the main ideas the commercial communicates to you?”221 Responses to
general, open-ended questions provide the “most persuasive evidence” of
consumer confusion.222
The NAD has also expressed a preference for open-ended questions,
which are “better indicators of how consumers interpret a commercial
message,” because respondents’ answers are not influenced by the
suggestions contained in the questions themselves.223 Closed-ended
questions may be used, but should be reserved for situations where it is
necessary to have respondents choose between the parties’ different
interpretations of an advertisement, or where an open-ended approach would
not assess subtle differences in meaning that are at the heart of the dispute.224
2. Filter Questions
Courts are more receptive to multiple-choice questions when they are
preceded by filter questions that screen out respondents who did not take
away any message on a certain topic of interest.225 Filter questions have been
described as questions that probe whether a relevant topic was
communicated to the consumer, and thus insulate from the possible
suggestive nature of multiple-choice questions.226
219. See, e.g., Cumberland Packing Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 561, 572 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (“The leading nature of the questions asked and the lack of instructions against guessing flawed
[the] surveys.”).
220. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms., Inc., 19
F.3d 125, 134 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 654 F. Supp. 568,
581 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
221. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
960 F.2d 294, 299 (2d Cir. 1992).
222. Id. at 300.
223. Campbell Soup Co. (Campbell’s Select Harvest Soup), NAD Case Report No. 4981, at 21 (Mar.
2009), ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/).
224. Id.
225. See Procter & Gamble Pharms., Inc. v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 2006 WL 2588002, at *23
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006).
226. Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290 F.3d
578, 591–92 (3d Cir. 2002).
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Filter questions themselves should not be leading or suggestive, and the
narrower follow-up questions should not be overly suggestive. For example,
the follow-up questions in Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer
Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer227 were found to be flawed,
because they were too suggestive and phrased in such a way that there was
only one logical way for respondents to answer. The claim at issue was
whether referring to an antacid tablet as the “strongest” implied that it
provided better relief when it actually only proved to be “stronger” at
neutralizing acid in a laboratory test. The follow-up question used in the
survey asked respondents what “strongest” meant to them, and the court
found that the only logical answer would be to elaborate on the “strongest”
claim in relation to acid relief.228 Otherwise, a respondent may have simply
taken away from the commercial that “strongest” simply meant “strongest”
at acid neutralization in a chemical sense.229
However, the follow-up questions used in another antacid case “met a
proper filter question threshold and could be accorded significant weight.”230
Those questions asked more generally whether the product label
communicated anything about how long the product would provide relief
and did not ask respondents to focus on any particular element of the product
label.231 Thus, the questions did not lead respondents to provide any
particular answer or allow for only one logical response.
The NAD has also endorsed filter questions and “believes that a
progression from open-ended to increasingly focused questioning” is a better
technique for soliciting unbiased evidence as to how respondents interpret
implied messages than using leading questions.232 After filtering out viewers
who did not receive any message relating to the claim in dispute, the
interviewer can ask the remaining viewers follow-up questions to determine
what message a particular aspect of an advertisement conveyed.233
3. Leading or Suggestive Questions
In Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co. v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp.,234 the Second Circuit rejected survey results
227. 19 F.3d 125, 134 (3d Cir. 1994).
228. Novartis, 290 F.3d at 592 (interpreting Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms., 19 F.3d at 135).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 593.
231. Id.
232. Merial Ltd. (Frontline Plus Flea & Tick Treatment), NAD Case Report No. 3844, (Dec. 18,
2001), ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/).
233. Id.
234. 960 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1992).
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based on leading questions and upheld a district court finding that the only
persuasive evidence of consumer confusion came from open-ended
questions inquiring about the overall message communicated by the
commercials at issue. In that case, the defendant, who manufactured the
antacid medication Tums, aired commercials that showed the plaintiff’s
antacid, Mylanta, along with a list of its active ingredients, including
aluminum and magnesium. The commercial touted Tums, which uses
calcium carbonate as the active ingredient for acid neutralization, as being
“[c]alcium rich [and] aluminum free.”235 The plaintiff claimed these
commercials misled consumers to believe that the aluminum or magnesium
in Mylanta was harmful.
The plaintiff conducted a survey that asked both open-ended questions
and more narrowly focused questions about the commercials. Based on the
results of the narrow questions, the plaintiff’s expert concluded that 45% of
the relevant respondents were misled.236 The Second Circuit upheld the
district court’s rejection of the survey results, which were based on questions
it considered to be leading: (i) “What, if anything, does the commercial
communicate to you about the aluminum and magnesium in Maalox and
Mylanta?”; (ii) “What else, if anything, does the commercial communicate
to you about the aluminum and magnesium in Maalox and Mylanta?”; and
(iii) “Based on the commercial you just saw, how do you feel about taking a
product for heartburn that contains aluminum and magnesium?”237 These
questions were found to be leading, because they flagged the allegedly
misleading specific message in the commercial for the attention of the survey
respondent.238 The court considered as persuasive evidence only the answers
to the broad, open-ended questions: “Aside from trying to get you to buy the
product, what are the main ideas the commercial communicates to you?” and
“What other ideas does the commercial communicate to you?”239 Only nine
of the 300 answers to those questions mentioned aluminum or magnesium
content as a potential danger, and the court found the 281 other answers,
which did not mention aluminum or magnesium, to be the most persuasive
evidence of the ultimate message communicated by the commercials—one
that did not mislead consumers.240

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 295.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 299–300.
Id. at 300.
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This case offers an example of a typical strategy in disputing the results
in a survey—arguing that the closed-ended questions or the follow-up
questions should be discounted or ignored as leading, while pointing to the
main idea/other ideas questions, showing that the challenged message was
not being communicated.
4. Closed-Answer Questions
Courts often give little or no weight to survey evidence based on
questions that force respondents to choose an answer from a closed universe
of options, especially when respondents are not given a “don’t know” or “not
sure” option.241 For example, the survey used by the plaintiffs in Gillette Co.
v. Norelco Consumer Products Co.242 asked respondents “Which, if any, of
these wet razors looks most like the wet razor shown in the commercial you
just saw?” while displaying twelve razors to the respondent. The court
considered this question to be “markedly suggestive,”243 even though the
question allowed respondents to choose no razor. The court found that the
question nonetheless led respondents to attempt to find a razor that most
resembled the razor from the commercial, even when they would not have
made the association without the prompt. However, the court noted that such
a closed-ended question might be acceptable if it instead followed an openended question that filtered out respondents who did not think that the
commercial’s image of a razor was similar to or evocative of an actual razor
on the market.244
Closed-ended questions are not inherently leading. A well-designed
closed-ended question can survive the lack of filter questions. In LG
Electronics U.S.A, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.,245 the court noted that “the
purpose of a filter question is to reduce guessing” and rejected Whirlpool’s
criticism of the lack of filter questions, finding that the survey’s use of “don’t
know” in the close-ended question sufficiently mitigated this concern to
allow admission of the survey.
Courts have also allowed variations on a multiple choice design to serve
as evidence of the implied communication. For example, in Sanderson

241. See, e.g., Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a
survey partially because “the interviewers conducted the survey in this case in a way that effectively
required the respondents to express a specific opinion, even if they did not have an opinion, by specifically
not offering the respondents the opportunity to give ‘not sure’ as a response”) (emphasis in original).
242. 69 F. Supp. 2d 246, 259 (D. Mass. 1999).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 261–62.
245. 661 F. Supp. 2d 940, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
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Farms, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,246 respondents were read a series of
statements and told that some, all, or none of the statements may have been
implied by or stated in the advertisement at issue. Respondents were then
told to answer: “(1) yes, the statement was implied; (2) no, the statement was
not implied; (3) I don’t know whether the statement was implied; or (4) no
opinion.”
5. Off-Target Questions
Survey questions may be improper if they do not reach an issue in the
case. For example, in Scotts Co. v. United Industries Corp.,247 survey
questions that employed the same ambiguous language as the advertisement
at issue were disregarded as non-persuasive.248 The main issue in that case
was whether the advertisement conveyed that the fertilizer being advertised
would kill mature crabgrass—which was not true—or if it would merely
prevent the growth of new crabgrass—which was true. The survey asked:
“Based on your review of this section of the bag, should this product prevent
the growth of [mature] crabgrass?”249 The court found that “[t]hrough the
use of the word ‘prevent,’ this question suffer[ed] from the same ambiguity”
as the contested packaging itself.250 Therefore, the court noted that although
more than 90% of the respondents answered “yes” when asked whether the
advertisement implied that Vigoro prevents the growth of crabgrass, those
responses shed no light on the key question to the false advertising claims—
whether the advertiser’s packaging “conveys the message that it can kill
mature crabgrass.”251
Similarly, in Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Laboratories,252 the
plaintiff conducted a survey asking respondents what they believed the
phrase “1st Choice of Doctors” meant, as used to describe defendant’s baby
formula in the advertisement. The Seventh Circuit found the survey
unpersuasive because it asked respondents to consider “1st Choice” as
representing a threshold percentage of doctor preference rather than the real
meaning of “first”—number one in a series.
Surveys may also suffer from asking questions that are too narrow and
fail to consider the broader, more fundamental issues in the case. For

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

547 F. Supp. 2d 491, 501–02, 507 (D. Md. 2008) (issuing preliminary injunction).
315 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 280.
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
201 F.3d 883, 884–85 (7th Cir. 2000).
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example, the ultimate flaw that the court found with the survey used in
Gillette Co. v. Norelco Consumer Products Co.253 was that it only asked
which razor the animated razor looked like and thus failed to consider what
the court considered the real issue—whether the commercial was comparing
the advertised product to any other product at all.
In Design Resources, Inc. v. Leather Industries of America,254 plaintiff,
an upholstering supplier, asserted false advertising claims against a trade
association in response to defendant’s advertisements warning that some
upholstery suppliers were using leather scraps in their products. Plaintiff
attempted to use a survey commissioned by one of the defendants to
demonstrate that consumers understood the allegedly misleading advertising
to be directed at bonded leather, which plaintiff argued was synonymous
with its products at the time. However, the survey responses made no
mention of plaintiff’s products; no respondents gave an answer that could be
interpreted as a belief that plaintiff or its products were specifically or
impliedly referred to in the advertising.255 Therefore, the court held that the
survey failed to provide evidence of consumer confusion, and, if anything,
appeared to disprove plaintiff’s case.
E. Interview Procedure and Validation
The procedures employed when conducting a survey must be proper
and objective. The survey expert must select competent interviewers who do
not pose a risk of tainting evidence with questionable tactics. The expert
must also use double-blind interviewing procedures, in which neither the
interviewer nor the participant knows why the survey is being conducted,
who the sponsor is, or what answers the sponsor hopes to obtain.256 The
anonymity of the sponsor is essential to avoid bias in the survey results.257
Improper interview procedures, particularly when combined with other
surveying errors, may lead to exclusion of the survey. In Procter & Gamble
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc.,258 data collection flaws
that rendered the survey inadmissible included: failure to collect non-

253. 69 F. Supp. 2d 246, 261 (D. Mass. 1999).
254. 789 F.3d 495, 503–04 (4th Cir. 2015).
255. Id.
256. See Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 2d 491, 499 (D. Md. 2008)
(accepting as reliable and persuasive a double blind survey); Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson
& Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 590 (3d Cir. 2002).
257. See Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Quaker State Co., No. Civ. A. 00-251, 2000 WL 1556019, at *11
(D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2000).
258. No. 06 Civ. 0034 (PAC), 2006 WL 2588002, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006).
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response information; destruction of original interview forms; flawed
interviewer and screening instructions; failure to comply with instructions
provided to site supervisors; failure to address differences in handwriting,
including the same handwriting under different interviewers’ names and
different handwriting under the same interviewer’s name; and inclusion of
unqualified interviewers.
A properly conducted survey must follow post-survey validation
procedures to confirm the reliability of the survey process. However, the
threshold for what courts consider to be acceptable validation is not
exceedingly high. In post-interview validation, an independent third party
contacts the identified respondents to confirm that they actually participated
in the survey and provided answers.259 For example, in one case, after the
survey was complete, the survey expert enlisted an independent telephone
interviewing service to verify the responses and to detect any fraud by the
interviewers. Specifically, the interviewing service contacted respondents
by phone to verify that the respondents: (1) existed, (2) met the universe
requirements, and (3) recalled completing the interview.260 One survey
expert testified that it is customary in the industry to be able to successfully
validate only 15 to 25% of responses,261 and another survey expert noted that
the 40% validation rate obtained in that case exceeded industry norms.262
F. Coding
Parties often disagree over whether certain individual responses to
open-ended questions actually convey deception.263 In one NAD decision,264
the challenger, Schick, alleged that Gillette’s advertising for the Venus
Divine razor conveyed to consumers that the Venus Divine would provide
post-shave moisturizing benefits to users, whereas Gillette argued that the
ads only conveyed that the Venus Divine provided moisturizing during, and
not after, shaving. In challenging the persuasiveness of Schick’s consumer
survey, Gillette argued that Schick’s survey experts improperly coded all

259. See Merisant Co. v. McNeil Nutritionals, LLC, 242 F.R.D. 315, 324–25 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (noting
that “validation is indeed important”).
260. LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 661 F. Supp. 2d 940, 954 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
261. Id.
262. Merisant, 242 F.R.D. at 325.
263. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Ultreo, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 339, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(finding that, in coding a survey regarding toothbrush commercials, the expert inappropriately considered
responses that referred to “ultrasound” and “sonic vibrations” as perceiving that the ultrasound alone
cleaned teeth).
264. Gillette Co. v. Schick Mfg., Inc., NAD Case Report No. 4305 (Apr. 2005), ASCR (http://casereport.bbb.org/).
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answers to open-ended questions that discussed moisturizing—both during
and after shaving— as evidence of deception. Gillette’s experts re-coded the
answers based on the verbatims provided by the Schick survey to obtain what
they believed to be a more realistic figure for the number of misled or
confused consumers. The experts concluded that after taking into account
answers to follow-up questions in cases of ambiguity, only 17.6% of
respondents were misled, a much lower percentage of respondents than the
51.6% claimed by Schick. NAD then undertook independent coding of the
responses based on the verbatim responses.265
IV. CONCLUSION
To the extent there appears to be an emerging trend, the use of
communication and other survey evidence in Lanham Act false advertising
lawsuits is on the decline, whereas the opposite is occurring in state law
consumer class action cases. Accordingly, the legal principles governing the
use of surveys in these disputes continues to be of interest to lawyers who
advise clients on truth-in-advertising issues.

265.

Id. at 27.

